by Rick Kiester, GCS Referee
I know that Andy Zappone has offered his critique of this past weekend's event at Street, MD and have read the event AAR for the Narva event so I will offer another view of the GD's event. I had the opportunity to act of one of the 4 judges at the GD event and was fortunate enough to get a "big" picture look at what happened, what didn't happen and what could have happened.
First off I'll say that it certainly seemed that almost everyone enjoyed themselves at this event. I actually don't recall hearing anyone really complaining about the way in which the tactical unfolded. That being said I will proceed to the more critical items. I offer this as an impartial critique since I do neither a German or Russian impression so I have nothing to gain. I hope that this is used to improve each respective side's tactical impression so that next time the cream of German manhood will not allow the godless communist bastards to win.
Each opposing force had right at 60 men in the field. The Germans operated 2 platoons. The Russians appeared to be in squad order only. The Russians actually had the hardware edge over the Germans; one lightMG and one 81mm mortar. The Germans had 2 Kubelwagens and 2 motorcycles. The infantry of both sides had the normal assortment of rifles and afew sub machine guns.
Problems with command and control for the Germans surfaced almost immediately upon contact with the Russians. Assaults were very one-dimensional; often simply frontal assaults, often with no coordination with adjacent units (squads/platoons) and an insistence to defend or attack from inferior positions. Also, the Germans were seemingly timid when it came to becoming seriously engaged. Probes were without urgency and assaults usually came up short. A couple of times I witnessed the Germans simply just give up and leave. All this being said it comes down to leadership; either at the company, platoon or squad level. I know for quite some time the German platoon commanders were not in contact with the company commander. One platoon commander was not quite sure where his entire platoon was. Tactical vision and strategy comes from the top. When out of contact with the next higher level then someone has to take charge. That was not evident with the Germans. They suffered for it and consequently lost the event.
The Russians were not as organized as the Germans were but they ended up operating in the field a bit better. The Russian defense was as one dimensional as the German offence but due to the scenario and the terrain it could much better afford to be. The Russians went nose to nose with the Germans at every opportunity and the Soviets kept their forces massed. With this type of defense the Germans could have found maneuver very useful in countering the Russians. Had the Germans combined maneuver with intelligent use of the topography the Russians would have been very hard-pressed to maintain their positions and most likely would have lost. One thing the Russians did do was to keep at the Germans on a regular basis. Although there were a number a lulls in the action the Russians always came back to hit the Germans again and again. Also, the Russian commander used concentration of force to his advantage. He would strike the Germans with everything he had at once; usually catching the Germans outnumbered 2:1 or even 3:1. The Russian commander stayed with his troops and evidently learned well from his last experience with the Germans at Street.
If the Russians demonstrate the same degree of improvement by the next event that they showed at Street the Germans are going to be hurting. For all the same problems that the Russians shared with the Germans as far as organization and tactical vision goes they performed better when it counted. They did act with a purpose and did manage to keep sight of their overall objectives. The Germans, on the other hand were seemingly complacent. The Germans reacted to what the Soviets were doing in a scenario that called for them to be on the offence. Tactical initiative was given to the Soviets and never taken back till the end of the day.
Both combatants need to concentrate further efforts on tactical adeptness and vision. Small units can demonstrate maneuver within their boundaries. Overall commanders need to give the troops the goals and keep the platoon commanders and squad leaders focused. Use imagination and develop plans of action that will use your advantages to their fullest extent. Overall these steps will produce a more enjoyable time for the troops. Win or lose more organization, better training and more drive will only serve to improve the overall field/tactical impression that is always the greatest challenge. Uniforms and equipment are easily had and anyone can put together an authentic barracks impression or walking out impression. The proper use of period tactics, decisive action, tactical awareness and the willingness to drive people to perform has to be learned. And it takes a great while before those efforts begin to pay dividends.